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The impact of the fee-for-service reimbursement
system on the utilisation of health services
Part I. A review of the determinants of doctors' practice patterns
J. BROOMBERG, M. R. PRICE
Summary
The impact of different methods of reimbursement on the
practice patterns of doctors has received little attention in
the local literature. This series of three papers attempts to
address this gap.
Here the international evidence on this issue is reviewed.
The 'information gap' between doctors and their patients
allows doctors to induce demand for their services. This
leads to the potential for doctors to increase the supply of
services when they stand to gain financially from doing so, as
is the case in the fee-for-service system.
There is extensive international evidence, at both national
and micro levels, of the link between increased utilisation and
the fee-for-service payment system. This is in contrast with
the pattern noted in the salary system, used in some health
maintenance organisations (HMOs) in the USA, or in the
capitation system, used in the British National Health Service.
The 'practice setting' in which doctors operate also affects
patterns of practice. In the local fee-for-service sector, 'third-
party payment' means that both doctors and patients have
little awareness of the direct costs of services. In other
systems, such as HMOs, there is a strong cost conscious-
ness on the part of practitioners. These differences in practice
setting account in part for the different patterns of utilisation
in these systems.
The fee-for-service system, as it is structured in South
Africa, thus leads to extreme inefficiency, and the develop-
ment of alternatives is becoming an urgent necessity. All
systems of reimbursement have certain problems, and some
combination may be the best solution.
S AIr Med J 1990; 78: 130-132.
The majority of private health care providers in South Mrica
are paid a fee for each service delivered (the fee-for-service
system). The effects of this method of reimbursement on
doctors' behaviour have been extensively studied in other
countries, and it is therefore surprising that so little attention
has been paid to this issue in local publications. This series of
papers attempts to address this gap. In this first paper we
review the international evidence on this and related issues,
and in the subsequent two 1,2 we describe the results of two
studies that examine these issues in a local context.
Supplier-induced demand
The critical role of health care providers in the generation
and containment of health sector costs has long been recog-
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nised, and has been the focus of extensive study in many
countries.
This focus should come as no surprise. Doctors act as the
gatekeepers to virtually the entire health care system. Their
decisions determine when a patient should be admitted to
hospital, what investigations and procedures should be under-
taken, and what drugs should be prescribed. Aside from the
direct costs of their services, doctors therefore have a major
impact on expenditure throughout the remainder of the health
sector. Some estimates put this share at 70 - 80% of total
health expenditures.3
This extensive influence over health care expenditure results
largely from the substantial asymmetry of information, often
termed the 'information gap', that exists between doerors and
their patients.
In most other economic sectors, consumers' likes and dis-
likes, as well as their ability to 'shop around', exert a crucial
influence on the demand for particular goods or services, In
the health sector, however, the 'information gap' hinders this
ability. Professional regulations, which preVent competition
among doctors, further inhibit the ability of would-be con-
sumers to make informed price- and quality-related choices.
Unlike most other economic sectors, therefore, both the
supply of and, to a large extent, the demand for health care
services is in the hands of the providers of health care. This
phenomenon of so-called 'supplier-induced demand' in the
health sector has been the subject of rigorous debate and
investigation for nearly 2 decades and there is broad consensus
as to its relevance in understanding the health sector.4- 6 One
powerful illustration of this is to be found in the evidence that
the utilisation of specific services increases significantly with
an increase in the density of providers in a particular area; for
example, an increase in the number of surgeons in an area has
been shown to produce increased rates of operations.7,8
The effects of different methods of
reimbursement on doctors' behaviour
The identification of the phenomenon of 'supplier-induced
demand' has led to the recognition of the potential for conflict
between the two roles that providers have to play. As agent of
the patient, on the one hand, the doctor acts as impartial
advisor on the nature and severity of illness, and on the type,
quantity and urgency of services required. As a supplier of
services to the patient, on the other hand, he or she often
stands to gain financially from the services dispensed,
This potential conflict has in turn generated interest in the
effects of different methods of paying providers on their
professional behaviour. In the fee-for-service system, in which
the provider is paid a fee for each item of service delivered,
income is directly related to the volume and cost of services
delivered. This generates an incentive to increase the supply of
services. In a salary system, however, income is fixed, and
there is no direct gain from an increased supply of services. In
the capitation system, in which the provider is paid a fixed
amount per patient on his or her books per year, there is an
incentive to increase the number of patients registered in one's
practice but not to increase the supply of services to these
patients, since this will not affect income.
A particular focus of international publications has been on
the fee-for-service system, since here the link between the ,
volume of services delivered and income is most direct, and
the potential for conflict between doctor as agent and doctor as
supplier especially acute.
At a national level, there is strong and consistent evidence to
demonstrate the link between increased utilisation of health
services and the fee-for-service system. One of the classic
studies is Bunker's 1970 paper,9 which showed that in the UK,
where surgeons are paid either a salary or some combination of
salary and capitation, the rate of surgical operations per capita
was about half that in the USA, where surgeons were and are
still paid on a fee-for-service basis.
The link between utilisation rates and the effects of the fee-
for-service system is further demonstrated by extensive evi-
dence from the various health systems of Western Europe and
Canada, as well as from the USA. In all these systems, doctors
have frequently responded to the lowering of real earnings
over time by increasing the amount of services delivered per
capita. ID-15
The evidence suggests that doctors have the ability to
increase the level of services provided, and that under a fee-
for-service system they appear to act in such a way as to
maintain a 'target income' by increasing the number of services
delivered when real earnings fall. Under a salary system,
doctors would have no choice but to accept a Cut in real
earnings, while under a capitation system they may respond by
taking on more patients, but providing more services would
not be in their interest.
The relationship between fee-for-service reimbursement and
utilisation has been studied on the micro-level as well. Here
too, the evidence points strongly to overutilisation when doctors
are paid on a fee-for-service basis.
Most of this work emerges from the USA, where the
development of health maintenance organisation (HMOs),
which variously pay doctors a salary, fee-for-service or a
capitation fee, has provided a natural laboratory for testing the
effects of these systems on utilisation panerns.
The most consistent panern to emerge is that HMOs reduce
expenditure by 10 - 40% compared with fee-for-service, inde-
pendent providers, largely through a reduction in utilisation of
hospital services. The differences in ambulatory care, such as
office and clinic visits, are generally insignificant, although
some studies have demonstrated that the HMOs in fact use
more of these services per capita, since their doctors shift from
inpatient to outpatient care to cut down hospitalisation costS.16- 25
The consistent reduction in hospital utilisation is an inte-
resting result. The fee-for-service system not only generates a
'perverse incentive' to overtreat, but in both the USA and
South Africa its structure specifically encourages the use of
inpatient rather than outpatient care. Technology-intensive
procedures are far bener rewarded than cognitive and con-
sultative services, and most of the former are performed in a
hospital sening. In addition, the use of hospital facilities is free
to doctors, with no overhead costs involved. One American
study estimates that overhead costs amount to approximately
60% of revenue for an office visit.8 It is obviously cheaper for
doctors to visit their patients in hospital. Finally, many hospi-
tals directly encourage doctors using their premises to maintain
a certain level of hospital utilisation.
In the case of pathological investigations, the evidence
shows again that utilisation tends to increase with the intro-
duction of a fee-for-service system, in which providers stand
to gain financially from the use of more frequent and more
expensive tests. 26
There is thus strong evidence that when providers have the
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financial incentive to increase the supply of services, as occurs
in the fee-for-service system, they will tend to do so.
Salary and capitation systems also have important problems.
In the capitation system there is a tendency for doctors to
develop lists that are too large, as well as to refer to specialist
care too frequently. Despite this, it is worth noting that British
general practitioners, who are paid on a capitation system,
treat over 80% of all patient episodes from start to finish. 20
Both salary and capitation payment systems have also been
accused of leading to inferior quality of care. The financial
incentives to cut costs may lead to under-referral and cheaper,
ineffective treatment. Practitioners may also be unmotivated
and disinterested in their patients. There is some evidence that
in certain health systems, salaried primary care providers tend
to give poorer quality careY This may occur, for example,
through such providers working shorter hours, or being less
responsive to their patients' needs and demands, since their
payment is fixed, irrespective of the amount and quality of
work done.
This is less of a problem in the capitation system, where
income depends on the number of patients on the practice list;
poor quality of care may reduce this number, and will thus
affect income.
It is also important to note that the increased volume of
services in the fee-for-service system is in itself no guarantee
of increased quality of care. Multiple use of the same service,
or multiple services, can give diminishing marginal returns, or
may even have detrimental effects.28 The first X-rayon admis-
sion to hospital is likely to be of great benefit. Daily X-rays
thereafter will be of diminishing benefit, and may even be
harmful. The implication is that reduced use of services need
not compromise the level of care.
A further point to note is that appropriate practice senings
may be designed to overcome the quality of care problems in
different systems of reimbursement. That this is possible is
shown by the numerous studies of HMO senings in the USA,
which have not been able to demonstrate differences in quality
of care between these and fee-for-service senings.29 This is
discussed in more detail in the next section.
The effects of 'practice setting' on 'supplier-
induced demand'
While the financial incentives inherent in these different
methods of reimbursement are obvious, the extent to which
they affect the actual behaviour of providers is not so clear.
Non-financial incentives, such as professional and ethical con-
siderations, and the sening in which providers practise, also
exert significant influence on provider behaviour.
The 'practice sening' of doctors in the fee-for-service private
sector in this country is a case in point. This sening is
characterised by the lack of any constraints on spending for
doctors. Firstly, neither the doctor nor the patient but rather a
third party, the medical aid scheme, is responsible for payment.
This means that both doctors and patients are not sufficiently
aware of the costs of services. This ignorance about costs has
again been well documented, as has the powerful impact that
education about costs can make on the utilisation of
services.3D-32
Secondly, doctors practise independently, with no institu-
tionalised mechanisms for developing treatment protocols,
systems for reviewing clinical practice or utilisation profIles.
This leads to inconsistent and irrational use of health care
resources.
It is thus hard to isolate the fee-for-service payment
mechanism from the sening in which it is applied, and in the
South African context it is likely that both contribute to
overservicing and irrational utilisation panems. However, some
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trials designed to test the effect of different methods of
payment within the same practice setting have also been
reported. In one US study of a group of registrars in a
paediatric training programme, the introduction of fee-for-
service payment was found to increase the use of outpatient
services significantly.H Similar results have been reported for
studies in other countries.
Many health systems in which staff are salaried are also
characterised by practice settings that reduce utilisation of
services. HMOs have an built in cost-eontainment incentive
since a global budget for all services is fIxed in advance, so
that both managers and doctors are conscious of costs, and
various cost-containing mechanisms are developed and
implemented. ' In addition, such systems often develop inten-
sive methods of peer review and medical audit, as well as
involving medical staff in the important aspects of manage-
ment.24
Conclusion
The design of an appropriate method of paying providers is
clearly an important and complex issue. The fee-for-service
system, particularly 3S it is usually structured, leads to extreme
inemciency in utilisation of scarce resources. The development
of alternatives is thus becoming an urgent necessity in the
South Mrican context. In this search for alternatives, we can
learn much from experience elsewhere. Among the important
points raised here are I1Tstly, that all systems of reimbursement
have certain problems, and that some combination of systems
may in fact be the best solution; and secondly, that the
practice setting in which providers work interacts in critical
ways with the method of reimbursement, and is as important
in the attainment of efficiency goals.
We acknowledge the assistance of Ms ]ennifer Harris in the
preparation of the manuscript.
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